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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper constructs a theoretical model to study labor market regulations in developing countries 
within the context of structural transformation. When workers are risk averse and the market for 
insurance against labor income risk is missing, regulations that provide insurance to workers (such as 
severance payments) are efficiency enhancing and promote structural transformation. However, 
regulations that simply create barriers to the dismissal of workers not only impede structural 
transformation, they also end up reducing the welfare of workers. The implications of some other 
issues like general regulatory burden, weak state capacity, and minimum wage regulations are analyzed 
as well. The paper provides some empirical evidence broadly consistent with the theoretical results 
using cross-country data. While dismissal regulations increase the share of informal employment, 
severance payments to workers do not. 
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transformation 
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 I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Structural transformation is an integral process of economic development whereby resources move 
from less productive activities to more productive activities. This can happen through intersectoral 
reallocation of resources in which case resources move from say, less productive agriculture to more 
productive manufacturing. Alternatively, structural transformation can also take place through 
intrasectoral reallocation of resources. An example of the latter would be a decrease in the share of 
informal/unorganized manufacturing and increase in the share of formal/organized manufacturing. In 
this paper’s theoretical model we focus on the latter aspect of structural transformation. The literature 
on informality identifies two key causes of it. One has to do with the motive of evading taxation. That 
is, by remaining informal, firms can avoid taxation. The other explanation is in terms of excessive 
regulation and labor market rigidities. The idea is that the regulation of labor markets in developing 
countries can have elements, such as restrictions on firing or high minimum wages, that induce firms to 
avoid meeting these regulations by remaining informal/unregistered. Again, this paper focuses on the 
latter without denying the importance of the former. 
 
Governments in developing countries attempt to regulate labor markets along a number of 
dimensions such as wages, hours of work, hiring and firing restrictions, and conditions of work. When 
analyzing the desirability of any regulation, including those in the labor market, a natural question to 
ask is if the benefits of these regulations exceed the cost. This immediately suggests the need to 
develop a framework which will allow us to analyze the optimality of different labor market regulations. 
The standard framework to study labor market regulations in developed countries is a one-sector 
model that analyzes how a regulation affects the demand and supply for labor, and consequently the 
aggregate output (e.g., Summers 1989). This may not be appropriate in a developing country context, 
however.  An important feature of developing countries is that a large fraction of the workforce is 
employed in informal/unorganized firms and as mentioned earlier, it is commonly believed that the 
excessive regulation of labor markets is one of the key factors responsible, preventing resources from 
moving to more productive formal firms.1 The aim of this paper is to provide an analytical framework to 
analyze labor market regulations in developing countries and study how they affect the intrasectoral 
allocation of resources between informal and formal firms. In addition, it also provides some suggestive 
empirical evidence broadly consistent with the theoretical results. 
 
In most theoretical works dealing with labor market policies, to be discussed later, workers are 
assumed to be risk neutral, in which case there is no role for social protection.  Policies such as 
employment protection or unemployment insurance are then viewed as distortionary by either raising 
the cost for employers or reducing the job search incentives for workers. Such models clearly 
understate the benefits of labor market regulations because if workers are risk neutral there is no need 
to insure them against labor market risk through social protection. Therefore, we construct a 
theoretical framework with two key features: risk-averse workers and the existence of an 
informal/unorganized sector. These two features allow us to study labor market regulations in a 
developing country context. Another feature of our model is job destruction by firms. This allows us to 
study labor market policies relating to firing of workers. 
 
                                                                
1 National Commission on Employment in the Unorganized Sector found that in 2004–2005, out of a total employment of 
455.7 million workers in the Indian economy, 393.3 million were in the informal sector (Kanbur 2017). According to Ghani, 
Kerr, and O'Connell (2013), the employment share of the unorganized sector in Indian manufacturing has remained at 
around 81% between 1989 and 2005. 
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In our model, there is a mass of entrepreneurs with heterogeneous entrepreneurial ability who 
can set up a firm in the informal sector using a simple technology with diminishing returns. 
Alternatively, they can set up a firm with a more sophisticated technology in the formal sector. There is 
a mass of risk averse but homogeneous workers who can work in either sector. While workers have 
identical productivities in the informal sector, the productivity in the formal sector is match specific. 
Firms in the formal sector commit to a level of wage in advance (similar to the competitive search 
literature) and hence fire workers with very low match-specific productivity. This is a way to capture 
endogenous job destruction in a static model and is similar in spirit to the framework of Blanchard and 
Tirole (2008). Workers who are fired in the formal sector get utility from home production/leisure. In 
equilibrium, workers are indifferent between working in the formal sector with a risk of unemployment 
or in the informal sector with a guaranteed but low-paying job. Therefore, wages are necessarily higher 
in the formal sector. 
 
To see the role played by risk aversion in driving the results, we first derive results for the 
benchmark case of risk-neutral workers. It is shown that if workers are risk neutral then the 
decentralized outcome is production efficient. However, when risk-averse workers face the risk of 
unemployment in the formal sector and markets for insurance against labor income risk are missing, 
the decentralized outcome is not efficient. Moreover, employment in the formal sector and aggregate 
output both are decreasing in the risk aversion of workers. 
 
Introducing policies that provide insurance to risk-averse workers is efficiency enhancing. It is 
shown that if the government can mandate severance payments to fired workers, both the aggregate 
output and the amount of labor employed in the formal sector increase. Alternatively, an 
unemployment insurance program funded by a layoff tax achieves the same outcome. While the two 
are equivalent theoretically, one or the other may be superior in practice. Mandated severance 
payments may suffer from noncompliance, either willful or because of the inability of a firm to pay it 
during crises. In this case, an unemployment insurance funded by a layoff tax may be preferable. The 
United States (US) unemployment insurance program with experience-rated contribution has this 
feature. The downside of state-provided unemployment insurance is that it may run into weak state 
capacity. In an extension, we capture weak state capacity by assuming that when government collects 
money from firms, only a fraction is given back to workers as benefits. The remaining fraction is lost 
due to corruption, mismanagement, etc. Clearly, leakage makes the policy ineffective and if the leakage 
is sufficiently high, no unemployment insurance may be better than poorly provided government 
unemployment insurance. 
 
Since workers are facing a risk of unemployment, one may be tempted to conclude that a 
policy that reduces job destruction in the formal sector would be welfare improving. Employment 
protection policies that make it difficult for firms to fire workers would be one such policy. It turns out 
that such policies are counter productive. While they reduce firing by firms in the formal sector, they 
end up worsening the existing distortion and reduce aggregate output. Therefore, while the provision 
of unemployment insurance can aid the process of structural transformation, firing restrictions that 
create administrative hurdles for firing impede the process of structural transformation. 
 
It is also shown that an increase in regulatory burden that makes it costly for firms to enter the 
formal sector reduces the size of the formal sector in addition to reducing aggregate output. Finally, the 
model is extended to study the implications of minimum wage regulations in this setting. A binding 
minimum wage in the formal sector reduces the size of the formal sector thereby impeding structural 
transformation. However, output and worker welfare increase initially before decreasing. Since the job 
destruction in the baseline model is suboptimally low, a binding minimum wage increases job 
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destruction which is a source of gain. However, this is offset by the distortionary effect of minimum 
wage on the profit of entrepreneurs. A binding minimum wage reduces the profit in the formal sector, 
and hence, the mass of entrepreneurs in the formal sector is decreasing in minimum wage. The latter 
effect starts dominating soon, and it turns out that a binding minimum wage doesn't achieve 
production efficiency in the model. 
 
In addition to the theoretical model, the paper also provides some empirical evidence on the 
relationship between labor market regulations and the share of informal employment using cross-
country data. The share of informal employment is obtained from the International Labour 
Organization’s (ILO) Key Indicators of the Labor Market (KILM) database while the measures of labor 
market regulations are obtained from the data set developed by the Centre for Business Research of 
the University of Cambridge. The key empirical result is that stricter dismissal regulations and higher 
minimum wages increase informality but more generous severance payments do not. These empirical 
results are broadly consistent with the theoretical results. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a brief survey of 
the related literature. Section III sets up the baseline model and derives the decentralized equilibrium. 
Section IV sets up the planner's problem to study the efficiency properties of the decentralized 
outcome. Section V studies labor market regulations which is followed by empirical evidence in section 
VI. Section VII provides concluding remarks. 
 
II. RELATED LITERATURE 
 
Fugazza and Jacques (2004) construct a theoretical model where the informal sector doesn't comply 
with regulations and tax contributions. Workers face a subjective cost of working in the informal sector. 
There is directed search by workers, and therefore, workers with low subjective cost work in the 
informal sector while those with high cost work in the formal sector. In equilibrium, firms are indifferent 
between opening vacancies in the two sectors. The key result is that an increase in tax or social security 
contributions increases informality while increased enforcement reduces informality. 
 
In Zenou (2008) there are two sectors: formal with search frictions and informal with 
competitive wages. Workers are identical and freely mobile between the two sectors. In the informal 
sector, there is diminishing returns to labor which makes the supply of labor to each sector 
endogenous. In addition to the search frictions, the formal sector has an entry cost or vacancy cost and 
unemployment benefits. He performs comparative statics with respect to unemployment benefits, 
hiring costs, etc. and finds the expected results on the incidence of informality. 
 
In de Paula and Scheinkman (2007), agents choose to become a formal sector entrepreneur or 
an informal sector entrepreneur or a worker. Agents differ in their entrepreneurial ability. Firms in both 
sectors hire capital and the cost of capital is lower for formal sector firms but they also have to pay a 
tax. Informal entrepreneurs can evade taxation but they are caught with a positive probability in which 
case the entire output is seized. The probability of getting caught depends on the size of capital. 
Therefore, firms requiring more capital are in the formal sector while others are in the informal sector. 
The highest ability entrepreneurs set up firms in the formal sector, middle ability entrepreneurs in the 
informal sector and those with lowest entrepreneurial ability decide to become workers. The authors 
perform comparative static exercises with respect to the rate of taxation and the rate of interest. 
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Albrecht, Navarro, and Vroman (2009) introduce ex-ante worker heterogeneity with respect 
to worker productivity in the formal sector and only high-productivity workers work in the formal 
sector while others work in the informal sector. There is exogenous job destruction in the informal 
sector as in a standard Pissarides model but the job destruction is endogenous in the formal sector in 
response to an idiosyncratic productivity shock. Firms have to pay a severance tax in the formal 
sector in addition to a payroll tax. Severance tax increases average employment duration in the 
formal sector, reduces overall unemployment, reduces the number of formal sector workers, and 
reduces the number of workers who accept any type of offer. A payroll tax reduces average 
employment duration in the formal sector, reduces the number of formal sector workers, and 
increases the size of the informal sector and the number of workers accepting any type of offer. 
Total unemployment rises. Severance tax decreases average productivity while the payroll tax 
increases it, but under both policies, net output falls. 
 
In Bosch and Esteban-Pretel (2012) formal employment contracts involve a hiring cost, payroll 
tax, and a firing tax upon job destruction while informal jobs do not incur these costs but are destroyed 
at a higher rate. Informal jobs are also subject to government monitoring. They are detected with some 
probability, in which case the job is destroyed and a fine is paid. Informal workers are allowed on the 
job search for a formal job. Informal jobs arise because for some low productivity matches it is optimal 
for firms and workers to establish an informal relationship that circumvents formal regulations. 
Ongoing formal and informal matches draw new idiosyncratic productivity at differential rates (the 
rate being higher in the informal sector accounting for the higher job destruction there). In this setting, 
policies that decrease the cost of formal jobs, or increase the cost of informality, raise the share of 
formal employment while reducing unemployment. 
 
In Meghir, Narita, and Robin (2015), firms in the formal sector are subject to corporate tax on 
profits, social security contributions for their workers, and severance payments upon laying them off, 
and have to pay a minimum wage. Workers in the formal sector are subject to income tax and are 
eligible for unemployment insurance funded by taxes. Firms in the informal sector are monitored and if 
caught, pay a fine. Firms differ in their productivity, post a wage and choose a sector in which to post 
vacancies. Workers are homogeneous and meet with firms randomly and accept or reject the wage 
offer. It is shown that tighter enforcement leads to less informality and higher output. 
 
As far as the empirical evidence on the impact of labor regulations on informality is concerned, 
Chatterjee and Kanbur (2014) use firm-level data from the Annual Survey of Industry (ASI) and 
National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO) to study informality in India. While the ASI data 
captures firms registered under the Factories Act—which requires firms with more than 10 workers to 
be registered—the NSSO data is a survey of unregistered firms. Any firm in the NSSO data with 10 or 
more workers is noncompliant with the Factories Act. There may also be some NSSO firms with nine 
workers who stay small and informal precisely to evade regulations. The authors find that the NSSO 
firms with employment of nine or more workers constitute 2% of all firms and 11% of employment.2 
 
To sum up, the existing literature either doesn't have job destruction by firms and hence 
cannot talk about employment protection-related policies or if they allow for job destruction as in 
Meghir, Narita, and Robin (2015), then workers are risk neutral in which case there is no need for 
employment protection. That is, while several papers in the literature examine the role of employment 
protection policies on informality and aggregate output, the rationale for employment protection (risk 
                                                                
2 The NSSO firms with 10 or more workers account for 1.5% of all firms and 9.8% of employment. Therefore, the number of 
firms that are noncompliers is much larger than the number that keep their size low to avoid regulations. 
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aversion with missing insurance market) is missing in these studies.  Hence, it is difficult to carry out a 
normative exercise involving employment protection policies. 
 
III. THE MODEL 
 
There are two sectors in the economy: a formal sector with a sophisticated production function and an 
informal sector with a simpler production function. The number of workers is given by .L  Workers can 
work in the formal sector or informal sector. Workers are risk averse and their utility function is given 
by ( )U c  , with ( ) 0U c   and  ( ) 0.U c    
 
There is a unit mass of entrepreneurs with the distribution of entrepreneurial ability given by 
( ).G   Entrepreneurs have to decide whether to set up a firm in the formal sector or informal sector. 
Firms in the formal sector face a fixed cost of F. A part of this fixed cost could arise from meeting the 
regulatory requirements of the state (the so-called cost of formalization). The other part of the fixed 
cost should be thought of as the cost of using a more sophisticated technology. Therefore, in our 
setting, informality can arise both due to regulatory burden and the unprofitability of modern 
technology for low ability entrepreneurs. 
 
The production function in the informal sector is given by  
 
 
1( ) ( ) ;  0 1i iZ B L
        (1) 
 
where 'B captures the general productivity of the informal sector and is given by  1BB 

    where  
1(1 ) .         The normalization of the constant productivity term in the above fashion reduces 
notational clutter.   is the entrepreneurial ability. 0 1   captures the diminishing returns to labor 
and allows for a determinate firm size. The wage in the informal sector is iw  which is determined 
competitively. Denote the profit of an entrepreneur in the informal sector by ( ).i    
 
The optimal choice of labor is given by 
 
 
1 1( )i iB L w
        (2) 
 
Therefore, the amount of labor hired by an entrepreneur with ability   is given by 
 
 
1
1( )
1i i
L Bw  
   
 (3) 
 
The profit of an informal sector entrepreneur with ability   is given by 
 
 
11( ) ( ) ( )i i i iB L w L Bw

            (4) 
 
Clearly, ( )i   is increasing in   and decreasing in iw .  
 
The formal sector production function is more complicated. Here the productivity of a worker 
is match specific. Denote the match-specific productivity of a worker by  which is drawn from a 
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uniform distribution over [0.1]. Once the match-specific productivity of a worker is revealed, the firm 
can decide whether to retain the worker or fire them. If firms use a cutoff rule whereby they retain 
workers with productivity above c and fire others, then the average productivity of retained workers is 
1
2 .
c  If they hire fL  workers then they retain (1 )c fL   of them, and hence the amount of labor in 
efficiency units that is used in production is  
 
 
21
2
e c
fL L

 
 (5) 
 
The production function is 
 
 
2
1 1( ) ( )
2
c
fZ A L

          
 (6) 
 
where A  is the common productivity term and we use the normalization 1 .AA       is the manager-
specific productivity term. 
 
A formal sector firm announces a contract ( , )f cw  which must satisfy the following 
participation constraint of workers.  
 
 (1 ) ( ) ( ) ( )c f c iU w U z U w      (7) 
 
That is, a worker expects to get a wage of fw  with probability 1 c   and z (cash equivalent of 
home production or leisure) with probability c  (in the event that the worker is fired). The expected 
utility from participating in the formal sector must at least be as high as the utility from working in the 
informal sector ( ).iU w  We are assuming that the fired workers cannot work in the informal sector. It is 
as if workers at the beginning of each period in our static model make a decision whether to work in the 
informal sector or look for a job in the formal sector with the possibility of being fired and staying 
unemployed.3 
 
Therefore, a firm in the formal sector solves the following maximization problem:  
 
2
1
( ), ,
1 ( ) (1 ) ( )
2
. .(1 ) ( ) ( ) ( )
f f c
c
f f c fL w
c f c i
Max A L w L
s t U w U z U w

 
 
   
 
          
  
 
 
  
                                                                
3 The assumption is similar to the assumption in Zenou (2008) where workers can either work in the informal sector or 
search for a job in the formal sector. In his dynamic model, the value of unemployment in the formal sector equals the 
value of a job in the informal sector. Also, for the problem to be meaningful, it must be the case that wic  z   So, the 
workers who are fired in the formal sector suffer a loss and therefore must be compensated through a higher formal sector 
wage. 
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Denoting the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the constraint by  , the first-order 
conditions are 
 
 
2
1 11( ) :  ( ) (1 )
2
c
f f f cL A L w

           
  (8) 
 
        : 1 1 0f c f c fw L U w          (9) 
 
 
        121 1: 2 cc c F f f fA L U w U z w L

      

       
  (10)  
  
Using ( 9 ) write ( 10 ) as  
 
 
12
1 11 ( )
2
c
c f fA L w

    

        
 (11) 
 
where  ( ) ( )( ) .
f
f
U w U z
U w    
 
Therefore, for a formal sector firm with productivity  , the three endogenous variables , ,f fL w  and c  
are determined by the following three equations: 
 
 
2
1 11 ( ) (1 )
2
c
f f cA L w

          
 (12) 
 
12
1 11 ( )
2
c
c f fA L w

    

      
 (13) 
 
 (1 ) ( ) ( ) ( )c f c iU w U z U w     (14) 
 
for a given .iw  Note that (12) and (13) imply  
 
 
1
2
fc
c f
w
w

 
     (15) 
 
Equations (14) and (15) determine fw  and c  independent of  the firm productivity 
parameter. That is, each formal sector firm offers the same  ,f cw   contract. The amount of labor 
hired by a formal sector firm is
 
 
 1 1 121( ) (1 )1 2 cf f cL A w


  

     
 (16) 
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Thus, in the model, a high-productivity firm is larger but pays the same wage and has the same 
firing threshold. 
 
Denote the profit gross of the fixed cost of operations of a formal sector firm by ( )f   which 
is given as follows: 
 
 
11( )
2
c
f
f
A
w

  
       
(17) 
 
The net return from entrepreneurship in the formal sector is ( ) .f F    The marginal 
entrepreneur with entrepreneurial ability   is indifferent between setting up a firm in the formal 
sector or in the informal sector, and this indifference condition is given by  
 
 
1
11( ) ( )
2
c
f i i
f
A Bw F
w

 
    

  
              
(18) 
 
Entrepreneurs with     open firms in the informal sector, while the rest open firms in the 
formal sector. 
 
We assume that the parameters are such that the following condition is satisfied in equilibrium:  
 
 
1 11 1
2
c
f i
A B
w w
 
               
(19) 
 
The condition above ensures that in the absence of the fixed cost F, all entrepreneurs would 
wish to set up firms in the formal sector and is satisfied if A is sufficiently higher than B. In this case, it is 
the fixed costs of setting up business in the formal sector that prevents some low ability entrepreneurs 
to enter the formal sector. As mentioned earlier, a part of the fixed cost is technological and a part 
could be regulation related. In this case, there will be some informality due to technological reasons 
and the rest can be attributed to regulations. 
 
The total employment in the informal sector is given by  
 
 
( ) ( )I iL L dG

  

    (20) 
 
where ( )iL   is given by (3). Similarly, the employment in the formal sector is given by  
 
 
( ) ( )F fL L dG

     (21) 
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where ( )fL   is given in (16). Since the total amount of labor in the economy is ,L  the following must 
be true: 
 
 I FL L L   (22) 
 
The model above has the following endogenous variables: , , , , , .I Ff c iw w L L   They will be 
functions of the exogenous variables: , , ,A B F  and .L  Equations (14), (15), (18), (20), (21), and (22) 
determine the six endogenous variables of interest. 
 
IL  and FL  give us the sizes of the two sectors in terms of employment. fw and iw  are the wages 
in the two sectors, and c  is the unemployment rate in the formal sector. Since there is a possibility of 
unemployment in the formal sector, the wage in the formal sector must be higher than that in the 
informal sector: .f iw w   
 
Denote the aggregate output in the informal sector by IZ  and the aggregate output in the 
formal sector by .FZ  Net output for the economy, which is our measure of production efficiency, is 
given by  
 
 (1 ( ))
I F F
cY Z Z L z G F         (23) 
 
where the term FcL z  is the home production of fired workers and the last term is the fixed cost of 
formal sector firms. 
 
In the comparative statics below, our variables of interest will be the net output, ,Y  the share 
of the formal sector in labor force, ,FL  and the welfare of workers, ( ).iU w   
 
IV. PLANNER'S PROBLEM 
 
To show how the risk aversion of workers combined with a missing market for insurance against labor 
income risk creates production inefficiency in the economy, we set up the problem for a planner who is 
interested in maximizing the aggregate output (23). The planner will have to allocate both labor and 
entrepreneurs to the two sectors to maximize aggregate output. The planner recognizes the limited 
span of control of entrepreneurs (diminishing returns to labor) and also the fixed cost, ,F  that each 
entrepreneur has to incur to start a business in the formal sector. The planner undertakes the following 
maximization exercise. 
 
 21 ( )1 12
( ), ( ), ( ),
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) (1 ( )) ( )
c
c f i
i f
L L I F
c f
B L dG A L dG
Max
z L dG G F L L L
      
 
     

     
     




 

             
 

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The details of the planner's maximization exercise are given in the appendix. What is notable 
is that the solution to the planner's problem corresponds to the decentralized outcome when 
workers are risk neutral. That is, in the risk-neutral worker case, the allocation of resources between 
the formal and informal sectors in the planner's problem corresponds to the decentralized outcome. 
Therefore, in the baseline model, the distortion in the decentralized case arises due to the risk 
aversion of workers. 
 
While we have proved analytically that when workers are risk averse, the decentralized 
outcome is production inefficient, we have not answered the question of the direction of 
inefficiency: Are there too many workers in the formal sector or too few workers? We verify 
numerically that with risk-averse workers, the aggregate net output is lower than in the planner's 
problem and there are too few workers in the formal sector. More precisely, we verify that the 
aggregate net output is decreasing in the degree of risk aversion as is the share of workforce in the 
formal sector. Additionally, the fraction of entrepreneurs operating in the formal sector is smaller as 
is the welfare of workers. Finally, when workers are risk averse, firms choose a much lower c  
compared to what the planner chooses. These results are verified in Figure 1. In Figure 1, as well as in 
all other numerical examples in the paper, we assume a constant relative risk aversion utility function 
of the following form: 1 11( )
xU x 
 
  where   is the risk aversion parameter. In Figure 1, the planner's 
outcome corresponds to the risk-neutral outcome (where 0).   Figures 1a–1f show that the 
following variables of interest are decreasing in the degree of risk aversion: aggregate net output, 
share of workforce in the formal sector, share of entrepreneurs in the formal sector, rate of job 
destruction, rate of unemployment, and worker welfare. 
 
Intuitively, when workers are risk averse and markets for insurance are missing, firms have to 
pay workers a higher wage to meet their reservation utility given that they may be fired. As a result, the 
level of c  chosen by firms in a decentralized equilibrium is less than what is optimal from the 
production efficiency point of view. This also reduces the profitability of firms in the formal sector 
leading to fewer entrepreneurs and workers in the formal sector. 
 
So far, we have not allowed firms to offer severance payments voluntarily. We have restricted 
the contracts offered by the firms in the formal sector to a ( , )f cw   pair. What if firms can offer 
severance payments voluntarily or if the government mandates severance payments? We verify below 
that production efficiency can be attained through severance payments. 
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Figure 1: Risk Aversion and Labor Market Outcomes 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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V. LABOR MARKET REGULATIONS 
 
A. Severance Payments/Unemployment Insurance 
 
Suppose firms can offer severance payments voluntarily. This takes the form of a payment, s, to each 
fired worker. So, firms offer a contract ( , , )f cw s   where s is the severance payment promised to each 
fired worker. Now, the firms in the formal sector will do the following maximization exercise: 
 
2
1
, , ,
1 ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( )
2
. .(1 ) ( ) ( ) ( )
f f c
c
f f c f c fL w s
c f c i
Max A L w L L s
s t U w U s z U w

 

     
 
           
   
 
 
The equations for this case are derived in the appendix. It is shown that the optimal choice of 
severance payments by firms is characterized by .fw s z   That is, firms fully insure workers against 
unemployment risk. This level of severance payments also ensures production efficiency. Intuitively, 
the key distortion in the baseline model discussed earlier is the lack of insurance for risk-averse 
workers. Since severance payments involve a transfer from risk-neutral firms to risk-averse workers, 
they are efficiency enhancing. 
 
Since firms have an incentive to offer severance payments voluntarily, there is no need for a 
mandate. However, if firms suffer from a credibility problem, a promise to pay severance payments in 
the future in exchange for lower wages now may not be credible. If there are credibility problems 
associated with a firm's promise, then a government mandate can have a role. If the government 
mandates severance payments at the appropriate level, production efficiency will be restored. 
 
Figure 2 shows the impact of a mandated severance payment on the labor market outcomes of 
interest. The relationship between severance payments and the labor market outcomes of interest is 
nonlinear. Aggregate net output, share of labor in the formal sector, and worker welfare increase with 
severance payments and then they start decreasing beyond a point. The turning point comes at the 
level of severance payments that fully insures workers and is also the production-efficient level of 
severance payments. Any severance payments in excess of this is counterproductive. 
 
A nonlinear relationship obtains between unemployment and the level of severance payments 
as well. Note that the impact on unemployment is a composite effect of changes in the share of labor 
in the formal sector and the rate of job destruction by the firms. As shown in Figure 2d, the rate of job 
destruction increases first and then decreases with severance payments as does the rate of 
unemployment shown in Figure 2e. 
 
Figure 2 clearly shows the efficiency-enhancing role of severance payments. A small severance 
payment increases aggregate output and promotes structural transformation. It increases worker 
welfare even though the unemployment rate increases. Figure 2c shows the impact of severance 
payments on the fraction of entrepreneurs in the formal sector. Since this corresponds to the number 
of firms in the formal sector, this can be thought of as the impact of severance payments on the 
extensive margin of employment. One advantage of our large firm model is that we can study the 
implications of a policy on firm-level employment as well, that is, we can study the impact of a policy 
on the intensive margin as well. Figure 2g shows the impact of severance payments on the intensive 
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margin (firm level) of employment. Figure 2g compares firm-level employment in the absence of any 
policy with the firm-level employment when optimal severance payments are in place. The solid black 
captures the no policy intervention case while the dashed line captures the optimal severance 
payments case. The line to the left of the point of discontinuity captures the employment of informal 
firms while the line to the right captures the employment of formal sector firms. The point of 
discontinuity is lower with optimal severance payment which simply captures the extensive margin 
effect. That is, there are more formal sector firms with optimal severance payments. For a given level of 
productivity, the employment of formal sector firms is higher with optimal severance payments than 
without it. For informal sector firms, the opposite is true. That is, they have higher employment with no 
policy than with optimal severance payments. The reason is that the informal wage is higher in the 
optimal severance payments case than without it. Therefore, optimal severance payments increase 
formal sector employment both at the extensive and intensive margins.  
 
Figure 2: Severance Payments and Labor Market Outcomes 
 
continued on next page 
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Figure 2: continued   
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
While we have talked about mandated severance payments as a policy intervention, it is 
equivalent to an unemployment insurance program funded by a layoff tax. So, suppose the 
government imposes a layoff tax of s and transfers the proceeds to unemployed workers. The outcome 
is equivalent to the case when s is the level of mandated severance payments. While the two are 
equivalent theoretically, one or the other may be superior in practice. Mandated severance payments 
may suffer from noncompliance, either willful or because of the inability of a firm to pay it during crises. 
In this case, an unemployment insurance funded by a layoff tax may be preferable. The US 
unemployment insurance program with experience-rated contribution has this feature. 
 
B. Noncompliance, State Capacity, etc. 
 
While the theoretical model shows the equivalence between severance payments and unemployment 
insurance funded by a layoff tax, mandated severance payments may suffer from noncompliance 
problems as happened during the financial crisis in the Republic of Korea. In this case, a government-
provided insurance funded by a layoff tax may be superior. The downside of state-provided 
unemployment insurance is that it may run into weak state capacity. One way to model weak state 
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capacity would be to assume that when government collects money from firms, only a fraction   is 
given back to workers as benefits. The remaining fraction 1   is lost due to corruption, 
mismanagement, etc.  1   will capture strong state capacity. 
 
In this case the maximization exercise for firms is modified as follows:  
 
2
1
, ,
1 ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( )
2
. .(1 ) ( ) ( ) ( )
f f c
c
f f c f c fL w
c f c i
Max A L w L L s
s t U w U s z U w

 

     
  
           
   
 
 
The above captures the fact that while the layoff tax is ,s  a fired worker actually gets  .s s   
Clearly, this would reduce the effectiveness of unemployment insurance. In the appendix, we verify 
that if firms offer severance payments voluntarily, the privately optimal level of severance payments 
(or unemployment insurance funded by an equivalent layoff tax) fails to restore production efficiency. 
The privately optimal level of s  doesn't provide full insurance:  
 
fw s z   
 
We verify numerically that if the level of   is too low, that is the leakage is sufficiently high, 
then firms do not want to offer any severance payments voluntarily. Additionally, the output-
maximizing level of severance payments is zero in this case. That is, even a policy maker doesn't want 
to mandate severance payments or provide unemployment insurance through a layoff tax in this case. 
 
Next, we study firing restrictions in the model and show how the results differ from severance 
payments. 
 
C.  Administrative Burden of Firing 
 
To see how we can study firing restrictions in the model, suppose that firms in the formal sector have 
firing costs which are in the nature of administrative burden denoted by b. It is important to note that 
the administrative burden is not a transfer to workers. The administrative burden of firing b, should be 
distinguished from the severance payments, s. The latter are a transfer to workers while the former 
simply makes it costlier for firms to fire workers. It should be thought of as the cost of complying with 
the firing regulations. 
 
Now firms do the following maximization exercise:  
 
2
1
, ,
1 (1 )
2
.  (1 ) ( ) ( ) ( )
f f c
c
f f c h c fL w
c f c i
Max A L w L bL
s t U w U z U w

 

  
 
           
  
 
 
The key equations for this case are derived in the appendix. Figure 3 provides results for how 
the variables of interest change in response to a change in b. Note from Figure 3a that the 
administrative burden of firing results is a decrease in aggregate net output. This happens because it 
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causes more resources to flow to the informal sector thereby impeding the process of structural 
transformation. As shown in Figure 3b, the share of workers in the formal sector decreases as the 
administrative burden of firing increases as does the share of entrepreneurs in the formal sector shown 
in Figure 3c. Figure 3d shows that the rate of job destruction decreases as does the rate of 
unemployment shown in Figure 3e. The decrease in unemployment is a consequence of the decrease 
in firing, ,c  shown in Figure 3d, as well as the decrease in the share of workers working in the formal 
sector, shown in Figure 3b, which is the only sector that has unemployment. Interestingly, an increase 
in the burden of firing also decreases the welfare of workers as shown in Figure 3f. Therefore, not only 
is this policy inefficient from the point of view of production efficiency, but the general equilibrium 
effect is such that the welfare of workers decreases as well. Therefore, it fails to provide protection to 
workers in addition to impeding structural transformation. 
 
Figure 3: Administrative Burden of Firing and Labor Market Outcomes 
 
continued on next page 
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Figure 3: continued 
 
  
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
 
Analogous to Figure 2g discussed earlier, Figure 3g shows the impact of the administrative 
burden of firing on the intensive margin (firm level) of employment. The point of discontinuity is higher 
with the burden of firing which captures the extensive margin effect shown in Figure 3c. That is, there 
are less formal sector firms if firing workers is onerous. Moreover, for a given level of productivity, the 
employment of formal sector firms is lower with firing burden than without it. For informal sector firms, 
the opposite is true. That is, they have higher employment with firing burden than no policy because 
the informal sector wage is lower with firing burden. Therefore, the administrative burden of firing 
decreases formal sector employment both at the extensive and intensive margins. 
 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that it is difficult for formal sector firms to fire workers in many 
developing countries including India and Sri Lanka. That is, b is high enough that 0.c   The result in 
Figure 3 suggests that this policy is clearly inefficient and more importantly it fails to raise the welfare of 
workers who are the intended beneficiaries of such policies. 
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To sum up, while the administrative burden of firing that are not a transfer to workers are 
counterproductive, severance payments or unemployment insurance funded by a layoff tax have an 
important insurance role which promotes structural transformation. 
 
D.  Increase in General Regulatory Burden 
 
Any regulation that reduces the incentive to enter the formal sector slows down structural 
transformation. The effects of a general regulatory burden such as the ease of doing business can be 
captured through F. An increase in F reduces the attractiveness of the formal sector and therefore, 
hinders structural transformation.  A decrease in F can capture the ease of doing business or it could 
capture a technological change that allows firms to operate at a smaller scale, making smaller firms 
viable in the formal sector. 
 
Figure 4 captures the impact of a change in F on several variables of interest. It is shown that 
the aggregate output (Figure 4a), the share of workers in the formal sector (Figure 4b), and the share 
of entrepreneurs in the formal sector (Figure 4c) decrease with F. It turns out that the wage that firms 
pay in the formal sector, ,fw  is decreasing in F. The firing rate, ,c  increases with F as shown in Figure 
4d. A consequence of an increase in the firing rate and a decrease in the share of workforce in the 
formal sector in response to an increase in F is that the rate of unemployment becomes nonmonotonic 
as shown in Figure 4e. Finally, the welfare of workers decreases with F  as is verified in Figure 4f. 
 
Therefore, a reduction in regulatory burden not only promotes structural transformation and 
thereby increases aggregate net output, it also increases worker welfare. That is, workers in both 
sectors gain. 
 
The model that we have developed in the paper can also study the implications of 
regulations/policies that become applicable for firms above a certain size. For example, the Factories 
Act in India requires firms (using power) with more than 10 workers to register. Similarly, the Industrial 
Disputes Act in India requires firms employing more than 50 workers to provide severance payments 
and firms employing more than 100 workers to seek permission from the government before firing any 
worker. In Sri Lanka, the firing restrictions apply to firms with 15 or more workers. 
 
To see the implications of such regulations in the context of our model suppose the firm size 
above which the firing regulation is binding is Lˆ . The qualitative results are going to be similar to the 
ones described above. One difference will be that now some formal sector firms will have an incentive 
to reduce their firm size to Lˆ  to avoid paying firing taxes. That is, the size distribution of formal sector 
firms will have a hole around Lˆ .4 
  
                                                                
4 Abidoye, Orazem, and Vodopivec (2014) find evidence that some firms in Sri Lanka try to keep the firm size below the 
threshold where firing restrictions start binding. 
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Figure 4: Regulatory Burden and Labor Market Outcomes 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
  
1.70 0.9
1.65
0.7
0.8
1.55
1.60
0.5
0.6
0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
0.5
0.6
0.07
0.08
0.3
0.4
0.05
0.06
0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
0.2
0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
0.04
Figure 4a: Regulatory burden and aggregate output
Figure 4b: Regulatory burden and share of labor force 
in formal sector
Figure 4d: Regulatory burden and job destruction
Figure 4c: Regulatory burden and share of entrepreneurs 
in formal sector
A
gg
re
ga
te
 o
ut
pu
t
Sh
ar
e 
of
 e
nt
re
pr
en
eu
r i
n 
fo
rm
al
 se
ct
or
Jo
b 
de
st
ru
ct
io
n
Sh
ar
e 
of
 la
bo
r f
or
ce
 in
 fo
rm
al
 se
ct
or
Regulatory burden Regulatory burden
Regulatory burden
Regulatory burden
0.040
0.038
0.18
0.20
0.036
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
0.032
0.034
0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
0.10
Figure 4e: Regulatory burden and unemployment Figure 4f: Regulatory burden and unemployment
Regulatory burden Regulatory burden
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
W
or
ke
r w
el
fa
re
A=8, B=1, L=1, γ= 2/3, Z=.5, ρ=1, F=.75
20   | ADB Economics Working Paper Series No. 543 
E.  Minimum Wage Regulation 
 
We can also study the implications of a minimum wage regulation in the model. It must be stated at 
the outset that the welfare analysis becomes more complicated in this case because we already have a 
distortion arising from risk aversion and now we are introducing another distortion in the form of a 
minimum wage. 
 
Suppose that the government imposes a binding minimum wage in the formal sector and 
assume that the minimum wage regulation is not binding in the informal sector. Denote the minimum 
wage by w. Firms in the formal sector take this as given and perform the following maximization 
exercise:  
 
2
1
,
1 (1 )
2
. .(1 ) ( ) ( ) ( )
f c
c
f c fL
c c i
Max A L w L
s t U w U z U w

 

 
 
          
  
 
 
The first-order conditions are5 
 
 
2
1 11:  (1 ),
2
c
f f cL A L w

           (24) 
 
 
    121 1: 2 cc c f fA L U w U z wL

    

       
  (25) 
 
The above two equations along with (1 ) ( ) ( ) ( )c c iU w U z U w     determine ,fL  ,c   and    
for a given w  and .iw   Essentially, c  for all firms is given by  
 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
i
c
U w U w
U w U z
    (26) 
 
The variables for the informal sector are determined as before which allow us to determine iw  
and   along with c  and the share of workforce in each sector. The relevant equations are obtained 
simply by replacing fw  by w  in equations (28)–(31) in the appendix. 
  
                                                                
5 For the above problem to make sense, it must be the case that w  wi, that is why we assumed that the minimum wage 
doesn't bind in the informal sector, and therefore, it doesn't directly affect the informal sector. 
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Numerical simulations shown in Figure 5 reveal that the impact of a binding minimum wage 
on aggregate net output is nonmonotonic as shown in Figure 5a. To understand the intuition behind 
this result, we need to first see the impact of a binding minimum wage on other variables of interest. 
A binding minimum wage leads to decreases in the share of workforce in the formal sector (Figure 
5b) and the share of entrepreneurs in the formal sector (Figure 5c). That is, structural 
transformation is impeded. Figure 5d shows that a binding minimum wage leads to an increase in job 
destruction. Since the formal sector firms are forced to pay a higher wage, they can satisfy the 
reservation utility of workers by keeping the firing threshold higher. A consequence of increased job 
destruction combined with reduced share of workers in the formal sector is that unemployment 
increases first and then starts decreasing as shown in Figure 5e. The impact on worker welfare is 
shown in Figure 5f. It is not obvious from the figure but we verify that starting from no regulation of 
wages, a binding minimum wage initially increases worker welfare before reducing it. The reason for 
the initial increase in worker welfare is the general equilibrium effect of increase in demand for labor 
in the informal sector. However, it is soon overtaken by the negative effect due to reduced demand 
in the formal sector. 
 
The most intriguing result is the nonmonotonic response of aggregate net output to 
increases in minimum wage shown in Figure 5a. The intuition for this result is as follows. Since job 
destruction in the formal sector is suboptimally low in the decentralized equilibrium without 
intervention, an increase in job destruction induced by a binding minimum wage is a source of 
efficiency gain. However, minimum wage worsens an existing distortion which is a low share of 
entrepreneurs and workers in the formal sector. Recall that in the decentralized equilibrium, the 
share of workforce and entrepreneurs in the formal sector is lower than in the planner's problem. A 
binding minimum wage reduces the profit in the formal sector, and hence, the mass of entrepreneurs 
in the formal sector is decreasing in the minimum wage. Additionally, entrepreneurs hire fewer 
workers. Therefore, both the share of entrepreneurs and the share of workers in the formal sector 
decreases with minimum wage as shown in Figures 5b and 5c. The net effect of minimum wage on 
aggregate output depends on the relative strengths of these opposing effects. When the minimum 
wage becomes just binding, the beneficial effect dominates and hence the aggregate output 
increases. Beyond a point, the distortionary effect starts dominating and as a result, aggregate output 
starts decreasing. Numerical simulations reveal that a binding minimum wage doesn't achieve 
production efficiency in the model. That is, as the minimum wage is increased, aggregate output 
starts decreasing before reaching the efficient level. Therefore, in this second-best world, minimum 
wage increases aggregate net output, but it is not appropriately targeted and hence fails to increase 
output to the efficient level. 
 
Having discussed the theoretical results, we provide some suggestive empirical evidence. 
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Figure 5: Minimum Wage and Labor Market Outcomes 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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VI. EMPIRICAL EXERCISE 
 
We now turn our attention to an empirical investigation of the relationship between the prevalence of 
informal employment and the three elements of labor regulations discussed in this paper, i.e., 
regulations that constrain firms from dismissing workers, govern severance payments, and relate to 
minimum wages. 
 
We pool country-level information across six developing country regions and the years 2000–
2014 to estimate regression equations of the following type: 
 
           1 2_ ln _Reit it it i R t itShare Informal Y Labor g X u u    (27) 
 
where i refers to country, t refers to time, Y is gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, Labor_Reg 
refers to one of the three elements of regulation we consider, X captures various controls, Ru  and tu  
capture region and year fixed effects, respectively and it  is the error term. 
 
Two points may be noted regarding our analysis. First, it is along the lines of Botero et al. 
(2004), the first cross-country study on the effects of labor regulations that covered developing 
countries, and the more recent work of Djankov and Ramalho (2009). However, our work differs in 
terms of the outcome variable of interest—a measure of informal employment in our case rather than 
the size of the informal sector in economic activity and other indicators (such as labor force 
participation and unemployment rates) in these studies.6 Additionally, our main interest is in 
understanding how different aspects of labor regulation affect our outcome variable. Second, the 
objective of our empirical analysis is simply to examine whether the predictions of the theoretical 
model developed in this paper match the broad patterns in cross-country data. We do not seek to 
establish causality. This relatively modest goal is necessitated by several factors, including the 
patchiness of the data available, especially on informal employment, and the lack of within-country 
variation in our measures of labor regulations over the relevant time periods (mostly due to the fact 
that regulations are often slow to change). 
 
A.  Data and Variables 
 
1. Share of Informal Employment 
 
Our measure of the share of informal employment is drawn from the ILO's KILM database. It is based 
on defining informal employment as the sum of own account workers and contributing family workers. 
This is less than ideal for two reasons. First, the measure is not available for the agricultural and 
nonagricultural sectors separately. The distinction is relevant for us as structural transformation 
typically involves a shift away from agricultural employment; since agriculture accounts for a large 
portion of own account and unpaid family workers, differences in the KLIM measure of informal 
employment over time (and across countries) may be driven more by shifts away from agriculture 
rather than changes or differences in the regulatory factors that are the focus of this paper. We get 
around this by including the share of agriculture in total employment as a control in our regressions. 
 
  
                                                                
6  Also, while we use actual data on informal employment, Botero et al. (2004) measure of size of informal sector is based 
on the opinion of experts who are asked to measure the size of the informal sector in their country. 
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Second, the KILM measure excludes several categories of informal employment. These are 
employers in the informal sector; wage employees employed by informal sector enterprises; and wage 
employees employed in the formal sector, but holding “informal” jobs in terms of the employment 
relationship—for example, jobs that do not come under the purview of labor regulation. Employers 
typically represent around 0.75% to under 7% of total employment in developing countries. The other 
two categories omitted from the KLIM measure are harder to quantify. 
 
Data availability is the obstacle to obtaining a more comprehensive measure of informal 
employment, with many developing countries' labor force surveys not distinguishing between the type 
of enterprise a wage employee is employed in (formal or informal sector enterprise) and lacking details 
on the nature of the employment relationship. For example, for the years 2000, 2005, and 2010, the 
number of countries with information on the share of informal employment (comprehensive 
definition) in nonagricultural activities was only 5, 11, and 18, respectively. The corresponding number 
of countries with data on informal employment defined as the sum of own account workers and 
contributing family workers (the KLIM measure) was 63, 71, and 78 for these years. Fortunately, both 
variables are strongly correlated when data are pooled for the year 2000 and beyond (correlation 
coefficient of 0.7). 
 
While data from KILM covers well over 100 developed and developing countries from 1980 to 
2014, there are many data gaps between years. To avoid these, we restrict our analysis to the period 
between 2000 and 2014 and interpolate values for missing years for countries that have at least three 
observations over these years. Restricting attention to developing countries which are also covered by 
the main database we rely on for labor regulations (see below), we are left with 53 developing 
countries for our analysis. 
 
2. Measures of Labor Regulation 
 
We capture regulatory restrictions on employee dismissal and the generosity of severance (or 
redundancy) payments using the CBR Labour Regulation Index (CBR-LRI) data set developed by the 
Centre for Business Research of the University of Cambridge (Adams, Bishop, and Deakin 2015). The 
database codes five aspects of labor regulation in 117 countries over the period from the 1970s to the 
present day. Each of the five are themselves based on 40 subcomponents of regulation. 
 
We focus on the “regulation of dismissal” aspect of labor regulation, itself composed of nine 
distinct subcomponents. One of the subcomponents is a measure of legally mandated redundancy 
compensation, which is the amount of compensation payable to a worker made redundant after 3 
years of employment, expressed in weeks of pay. The variable is normalized such that 0 weeks of pay is 
assigned a value of 0 and 12 weeks of pay is assigned a value of 1. We use this variable as our measure 
of generosity of severance pay, or redundancy compensation. 
 
Next, we average the remaining eight variables to construct a measure of the severity of 
dismissal regulations purged of rules on severance/redundancy pay. Like the measure of generosity of 
severance pay, higher values of the residual measure of dismissal regulations are more proworker. 
Given the country and year coverage of our dependent variable, the two measures used from the CBR-
LRI data set cover 53 countries over 2000–2014. 
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To examine the effect of minimum wages on informal employment, we compute the ratio of 
minimum wages to GDP per capita. Like our other two measures of labor regulation, higher values of 
this ratio represent a more proworker regulatory regime. Our source of cross-country information on 
(monthly) minimum wages is the ILO STAT database. The database excludes minimum wages 
determined by collective bargaining. In cases where the minimum wages differ across subnational 
regions, either the minimum wage for the capital city or an average of regional wages is used. For 
countries that mandate minimum wages by sector, the minimum wage for manufacturing or unskilled 
labor is applied. We compute the ratio by first converting the monthly minimum wage data from ILO 
STAT, expressed in current local currency, into current US dollars using market exchange rates from 
the World Bank World Development Indicators. These are divided by 1/12th of GDP per capita to 
arrive at the ratio of the monthly minimum wage to GDP per capita. This ratio is computed for 56 
developing countries from 2000 to 2013. 
 
3. Other Variables 
 
Aside from GDP per capita and the share of agriculture in total employment (Agrishare), both of which 
are from the World Development Indicators database, respectively, we also include as controls 
measures of the ease of paying taxes and access to credit provided in the World Bank's Doing Business 
(DB) database. Both the tax regime as well as access to credit are widely believed to influence firms' 
decision to formalize or not (see, for example, the work of Djankov et al. 2008). Controlling for these 
is, therefore, important, especially as countries with relatively flexible labor regulations are likely to 
have a general regulatory environment that is business friendly. We do so by using the DB database's 
country-specific “distance to frontier” measure for the ease of paying taxes and access to credit 
variables, and for which lower values represent better regulatory environments. We use the average of 
the distance to frontier values per country across DB years to allow for better coverage when 
estimating equation (27). This is not too much of a loss as much of the variation in these measures 
appears across countries rather than over time for the period we consider. 
 
Finally, we control for enforcement of regulation in some of our analysis. We experiment with 
two measures of enforcement, namely: (i) the number of labor inspectors per 10,000 employed persons, 
sourced from the ILOSTAT database and available for 26 developing countries and various years 
between 2009 to 2014; and (ii) the rule of law index from the World Bank's World Governance 
Indicators, which is available for 2000, 2002–2015 for 215 countries and measures the confidence of 
agents in the rules of society, the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, the courts, 
and the likelihood of crime and violence. Higher values represent greater adherence to the rule of law. 
 
The relationship between these measures of enforcement and informal employment may well 
differ; it is also likely to be complex. For example, a larger number of inspectors is likely to imply greater 
enforcement of labor regulations; if labor regulations impose constraints on the formalization process, 
then greater enforcement would be associated with greater informal employment. On the other hand, 
the other two enforcement measures capture more qualitative aspects of regulatory institutions. 
Higher scores on these are likely to be associated with regulatory systems that are conducive to 
formalization and a decline in informal employment. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Region 
Share of Own 
Account and 
Contributing 
Family 
Workers 
Dismissal 
Regulations 
as Defined in 
the Text 
Redundancy 
Compensation
Minimum 
Wage to GDP 
per Capita 
Ratio (%) 
 
GDP per 
Capita 
(real USD) 
 
 
Number of 
Countries 
 
 
Years  
Covered 
All regions 43.05 0.51 0.66 54.95 2,950.91 53 (47 for 
minimum wage) 
2000–2014 
(2013 for 
minimum wage) 
(22.44) (0.16) (0.35) (44.73) (2,340.82)
East Asia 
and the 
Pacific 
54.64 0.53 0.72 55.15 2,058.63 7 2000–2014 
(2013 for 
minimum wage) 
(18.56) (0.15) (0.34) (48.37) (1,865.33)
Europe and 
Central Asia 
29.25 0.54 0.54 26.19 4,366.95 13 (12 for 
minimum wage) 
2000–2014 
(2013 for 
minimum wage) 
(18.10) (0.33) (0.11) (16.34) (2,868.58)
Latin 
America 
38.71 0.41 0.86 61.43 3,729.53 13 (12 for 
minimum wage) 
2000–2014 
(2013 for 
minimum wage) 
(11.61) (0.17) (0.22) (29.65) (1,862.95)
Middle East 
and North 
Africa 
29.54 0.63 0.74 80.72 2,396.41 7 (6 for  
minimum wage) 
2000–2013
(14.90) (0.11) (0.34) (73.69) (849.97)
South Asia 63.40 0.63 0.67 58.00 875.26 4 2000–2013 
(2011 for 
minimum wage) 
(17.49) (0.13) (0.32) (21.67) (412.61)
Sub-
Saharan 
Africa 
61.50 0.47 0.34 72.45 1,582.01 9 (6 for  
minimum wage) 
2000–2013
(27.84) (0.12) (0.32) (51.76) (1,895.09)
GDP = gross domestic product, USD = United States dollar. 
Note: Figures represent average values for all available years (with standard deviation in parenthesis). 
Source: Authors’ estimates based on CBRLRI database (accessed 5 January 2016); ILO KILM. 
http://www.ilo.org/ilostat/faces/wcnav_defaultSelection?_afrLoop=246699509158316&_afrWindowMode=0&_afrWindowId=null#!%40%40%
3F_afrWindowId%3Dnull%26_afrLoop%3D246699509158316%26_afrWindowMode%3D0%26_adf.ctrl-state%3Dg2madkays_45 (accessed 5 
March 2016); and World Development Indicators databases.  https://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators (accessed 1 
June 2016).  
 
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the main variables of interest—the share of informal 
employment based on the KLIM measure and the three elements of labor regulation—plus GDP per 
capita. There is considerable variation in the prevalence of informal employment across the developing 
world, with shares largest in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa (around 55%) and lowest in 
developing countries in Europe and Central Asia (around 16%) over the period considered. As for labor 
regulations, Latin America and South Asia tend to have greater restrictions on dismissal and more 
generous severance pay. Minimum wages tend to be higher relative to GDP per capita in Middle East 
and North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
As one would expect, a simple scatterplot of the KLIM measure of informal employment and 
GDP per capita shows a strong inverse relationship between the two variables (first panel of Figure 6). 
That is, informality declines as we observe countries at higher levels of development. We also plot the 
share of informal employment against our measures of labor regulations (remaining panels, Figure 6). 
To varying degrees, all three measures appear to be positively correlated with informality, though the 
relationship appears weakest for redundancy compensation.  
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Figure 6: Scatter Plots: Share of Informal Employment (own account workers)
 
Source: Authors’ estimates based on CBRLRI database (accessed 5 January 2016); ILO KILM. 
http://www.ilo.org/ilostat/faces/wcnav_defaultSelection?_afrLoop=246699509158316&_afrWindowMode=0&_afrWindowId=null#!%40%
40%3F_afrWindowId%3Dnull%26_afrLoop%3D246699509158316%26_afrWindowMode%3D0%26_adf.ctrl-state%3Dg2madkays_45 
(accessed 5 March 2016); and World Development Indicators databases.  https://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-
indicators (accessed 1 June 2016). 
 
B. Results 
 
We perform three separate regressions to isolate the effect of the two regulations and minimum wages 
on the share of informal employment. GDP per capita and the share of agriculture in total employment 
are introduced as controls in all specifications. We begin with a baseline specification and then add 
more controls. A first set of these additional controls pertain to the regulatory environment (access to 
credit and paying taxes from the World Bank's Doing Business database), and the second pertains to 
measures of enforcement and rule of law. 
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The positively and significantly estimated coefficient on the index of dismissal regulations in 
column 1 of Table 2 implies that tougher dismissal laws are associated with a higher share of informal 
employment. Adding controls for the business environment by introducing “distance to frontier” 
measures for access to credit and the tax regime, widely believed to be important determinants of 
informality, does not alter the positive association between tougher dismissal laws and the share of 
informal employment (columns 2 and 3). (Interestingly, the estimated coefficient of only the tax 
regime is positively signed, suggesting that in our sample, at least, and with controls for incomes and 
agricultural employment included, a weaker tax regime but not weaker access to credit is associated 
with greater informal employment.)7 
 
Since enforcement regimes can vary considerably, it is useful to control for these, 
something done in the specifications reported in columns 4 and 5. A direct measure of 
enforcement of labor regulations—the number of labor inspectors per 10,000 employees—is 
available for only 22 of our sample 53 countries. Nevertheless, the results are interesting. While 
the dismissal regulation variable on its own is statistically insignificant (and negatively signed), its 
interaction with the inspection rate is positive and significant (column 4), suggesting that in 
countries with stricter enforcement of labor regulation, tougher dismissal regulations have a bite 
and dampen the creation of formal employment opportunities. Thus, consider the 25th and 75th 
percentile values of the inspection rate across the 73 observations used in generating column 4. 
These values are 0.3 and 0.6, respectively. While the former (the average value for Brazil) implies 
that a 0.1 point increase in the strength of dismissal regulation leads to an increase of 1.1 
percentage points in the share of informal employment, the latter (the average value for Sri Lanka) 
implies an increase of 3.2 percentage points in the share of informal employment. Stricter 
inspection itself is negatively associated with informal employment. These findings are repeated 
qualitatively, and with greater force, in column 5 where the inspection rate variable is substituted 
with the rule of law index. Here, dismissal regulation is associated with greater informal 
employment both on its own as well as in countries with a stronger rule of law. 
 
Switching from dismissal regulation to severance pay changes results dramatically (Table 3). In 
no specification is having a more generous redundancy compensation associated with greater informal 
employment. In the only case where a term involving redundancy compensation appears with a 
statistically significant effect—in interaction with the rule of law in column 5—the estimated 
coefficient is negatively signed. The negative coefficient of the interaction term suggests that in 
countries with a stronger rule of law a stronger redundancy compensation lowers informal 
employment. 
  
                                                                
7 Recall that a low value of these variables captures better regulatory environment. Therefore, a positive association 
between informal employment and ease of paying taxes implies that better regulatory environment is positively associated 
with formal employment, a result consistent with the impact of regulatory burden on formal employment discussed in the 
theoretical model. 
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Table 2: Regression Results, Dismissal Regulations  
  
Regulatory Environment
(distance to frontier controls) Enforcement Regime 
Share of Own Account 
Workers 
Base 
Specification 
(1) 
Access to Credit 
(2) 
Ease of Paying 
Taxes 
(3) 
Inspection Rate 
(4) 
Rule of Law 
(5) 
In GDP per capita  
(real USD) 
–5.16*** –4.71*** –5.30*** 5.23*** –4.58***
(0.62) (0.65) (0.61) (2.55) (0.71)
Dismissal regulations 9.51*** 10.58*** 11.34*** –9.53 8.85***
(2.37) (2.42) (2.43) (12.29) (2.82)
Share of employment  
in agriculture 
0.87*** 0.87*** 0.88*** 1.18*** 0.84***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.14) (0.03)
Access to credit  –0.05***  
 (0.02)  
Ease of paying taxes  0.08***  
 (0.03)  
Inspection rate  –48.14*** 
 (15.88) 
Inspection rate x 
Dismissal regulations 
 69.76*** 
 (25.93) 
Rule of law index   –9.94***
  (2.54)
Rule of law index x 
Dismissal regulations 
  14.21***
  (4.51)
East Asia and the Pacific –7.12*** –6.82*** –8.92*** –13.37*** –4.71***
(1.16) (1.16) (1.30) (3.26) (1.39)
Europe and Central Asia –14.99*** –14.80*** –16.52*** –12.58*** –14.01***
(0.99) (0.99) (1.11) (2.67) (1.09)
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
- - - - -
Middle East and North 
Africa 
–15.18*** –16.60*** –16.71*** –15.58*** –12.71***
(1.28) (1.44) (1.37) (5.67) (1.53)
South Asia –5.55*** –5.44*** –6.44*** –5.20 –2.67
(1.58) (1.58) (1.60) (4.52) (1.90)
Sub-Saharan Africa –11.59*** –11.06*** –13.69** –10.86** –9.75***
(1.27) (1.45) (1.45) (4.24) (1.49)
Constant 56.87*** 55.67*** 53.52*** –16.57 51.27***
(5.70) (5.71) (5.77) (25.52) (6.39)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 595 595 595 73 545
R-squared 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.83 0.88
Number of countries 53 53 53 22 51
USD = United States dollar. 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<001, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Source: Authors’ estimates based on CBRLRI database (accessed 5 January 2016); ILO KILM. 
http://www.ilo.org/ilostat/faces/wcnav_defaultSelection?_afrLoop=246699509158316&_afrWindowMode=0&_afrWindowId=null#!%40%40
%3F_afrWindowId%3Dnull%26_afrLoop%3D246699509158316%26_afrWindowMode%3D0%26_adf.ctrl-state%3Dg2madkays_45 
(accessed 5 March 2016); World Development Indicators databases.  https://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators 
(accessed 1 June 2016); and World Governance Indicators. http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#home (accessed 1 June 2016). 
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Table 3: Regression Results, Redundancy Compensation 
  
Regulatory Environment
(distance to frontier controls) Enforcement Regime 
Share of Own Account Workers 
Base 
Specification 
(1) 
Access to Credit
(2) 
Ease of Paying 
Taxes 
(3) 
Inspection Rate 
(4) 
Rule of Law 
(5) 
In GDP per capita (real USD) –5.29*** –5.11*** –5.39*** 4.91 –4.69***
 (0.62) (0.65) (0.63) (3.28) (0.71)
Redundancy compensation 1.39 1.18 1.46 2.01 –1.17
 (1.09) (1.12) (1.09) (5.69) (1.42)
Share of employment in agriculture 0.86*** 0.87*** 0.87*** 1.28*** 0.86***
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.17) (0.03)
Access to credit -0.02  
 (0.02)  
Ease of paying taxes 0.05*  
 (0.03)  
Inspection rate –4.00 
 (3.55) 
Inspection rate x Redundancy 
compensation    –4.38  
 (7.20) 
Rule of law index  0.90
  (1.45)
Rule of law index x Redundancy 
compensation     –6.22*** 
  (1.83)
East Asia and the Pacific –5.73*** –5.58*** –6.69*** –11.84*** –4.10***
 (1.16) (1.17) (1.27) (3.89) (1.30)
Europe and Central Asia –13.12*** –13.03*** –13.87*** –11.28*** –13.10***
 (1.00) (1.01) (1.08) (2.93) (1.04)
Latin America and the Caribbean - - - - -
  
Middle East and North Africa –12.96*** –13.54*** –13.65*** –10.88 –10.30***
 (1.20) (1.35) (1.26) (6.66) (1.33)
South Asia –3.16** –3.06** –3.45** –6.45 –1.45
 (1.54) (1.55) (1.55) (5.26) (1.73)
Sub-Saharan Africa –10.42*** –10.29*** –11.63*** –9.53* –8.31***
 (1.44) (1.44) (1.58) (5.11) (1.58)
Constant 60.49*** 60.51*** 58.99*** –25.88 55.38***
 (5.79) (5.79) (5.84) (28.44) (6.52)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 595 595 595 73 545
R-squared 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.77 0.88
Number of countries 53 53 53 22 51
GDP = gross domestic product, USD = United States dollar. 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<001, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Source: Authors’ estimates based on CBRLRI database (accessed 5 January 2016); ILO KILM.  
http://www.ilo.org/ilostat/faces/wcnav_defaultSelection?_afrLoop=246699509158316&_afrWindowMode=0&_afrWindowId=null#!%40%
40%3F_afrWindowId%3Dnull%26_afrLoop%3D246699509158316%26_afrWindowMode%3D0%26_adf.ctrl-state%3Dg2madkays_45 
(accessed 5 March 2016); World Development Indicators databases.  https://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-
indicators (accessed 1 June 2016); and World Governance Indicators. http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#home (accessed 1 June 
2016).  
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Table 4: Regression Results, Minimum Wage to GDP Ratio 
  
Regulatory Environment
(distance to frontier controls) Enforcement Regime 
Share of Own Account Workers 
Base 
Specification 
(1) 
Access to Credit
(2) 
Ease of Paying 
Taxes 
(3) 
Inspection Rate 
(4) 
Rule of Law 
(5) 
In GDP per capita (real USD) –3.75*** –3.71*** –3.83*** 4.55 –2.49***
 (0.70) (0.72) (0.70) (3.08) (0.79)
Minwage to GDP ratio 0.02** 0.02** 0.02** 0.03 0.08***
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (0.02)
Share of employment in agriculture 0.89*** 0.89*** 0.89*** 1.28*** 0.87***
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.15) (0.03)
Access to credit –0.01  
 (0.03)  
Ease of paying taxes 0.04  
 (0.03)  
Inspection rate 11.43* 
 (6.66) 
Inspection rate x Minwage  
to GDP ratio 
–0.59*** 
 (0.21) 
Rule of law index  –9.10***
  (1.48)
Rule of law index x Minwage  
to GDP ratio 
 0.10***
  (0.03)
East Asia and the Pacific –4.77*** –4.78*** –5.50*** –13.49*** –3.58**
 (1.32) (1.32) (1.43) (4.36) (1.39)
Europe and Central Asia –13.02*** –13.00*** –13.67*** –14.09*** –13.26***
 (1.03) (1.04) (1.14) (2.81) (1.07)
Latin America and the Caribbean - - - - -
  
Middle East and North Africa –14.33*** –14.48*** –14.90*** 2.88 –12.61***
 (1.23) (1.43) (1.31) (7.39) (1.39)
South Asia –2.37 –2.35 –2.57 - 0.98
 (1.70) (1.71) (1.71)  (1.86)
Sub-Saharan Africa –6.86*** –6.85*** –7.92*** –6.59 –4.05**
 (1.59) (1.60) (1.78) (4.73) (1.77)
Constant 49.05*** 49.12*** 48.04*** –19.38 34.38***
 (6.28) (6.30) (6.32) (28.91) (7.12)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 489 489 489 68 445
R-squared 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.79 0.89
Number of countries 47 47 47 20 45
GDP = gross domestic product, USD = United States dollar. 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<001, ** p<0.05, * p<0. 
Source: Authors’ estimates based on CBRLRI database (accessed 5 January 2016); ILO KILM. 
http://www.ilo.org/ilostat/faces/wcnav_defaultSelection?_afrLoop=246699509158316&_afrWindowMode=0&_afrWindowId=null#!%40%
40%3F_afrWindowId%3Dnull%26_afrLoop%3D246699509158316%26_afrWindowMode%3D0%26_adf.ctrl-state%3Dg2madkays_45 
(accessed 5 March 2016); World Development Indicators databases.  https://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-
indicators (accessed 1 June 2016); and World Governance Indicators. http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#home (accessed 1 June 
2016).   
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While we do not get a statistically significant association between severance pay and informal 
employment, it is worth reiterating that the results are significantly different from that for dismissal 
regulations, which was one of the key points of the theoretical model. While the theoretical model showed 
that severance payments can promote structural transformation by providing insurance to risk-averse 
workers, it also showed that there exists an optimal level of severance payments and a severance payment 
more generous than this level would impede structural transformation. No such ambiguity exists regarding 
dismissal regulations and therefore the empirical results are broadly consistent with the theoretical model. 
 
As for minimum wages, the results reported in Table 4 are similar to those for dismissal 
regulations. Countries with higher minimum wages relative to aggregate income levels as captured by 
GDP per capita tend to have higher shares of informal employment. Moreover, this association remains 
even when we include our various controls. The only exception is when we work with the inspection rate 
as a control for the enforcement regime. Switching from the inspection rate to the rule of law index as our 
control for the enforcement regime, however, yields qualitatively very similar results to Table 2: relatively 
high minimum wages in countries with strong rule of law seem to add to informality. 
 
Overall, these results, though suggestive, do match up broadly with the theoretical predictions 
of this paper's model of the process of structural transformation in developing countries. 
 
 
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Determining what types of labor market regulations are optimal for developing countries is 
challenging. In this paper, we constructed a theoretical model to get a better understanding of the 
issues involved. Our results suggest that getting rid of regulations that protect jobs and not workers 
is a good idea. Creating administrative hurdles for firms seeking to dismiss or layoff workers—such as 
through India's Industrial Disputes Act 1947 (see Anant et al. 2006 for details)—is a prime example 
of a policy protecting jobs and not workers. It is shown that mandated severance payments or 
unemployment insurance funded by a layoff tax can provide social protection and promote 
structural transformation by increasing the fraction of workers employed in the more productive 
formal sector and reducing informality. While in principle it is a good idea for the state to provide 
social protection to workers, whether it can actually execute such policies depends on state capacity. 
Empirically we find that labor market regulations that make it more difficult to fire workers increase 
informality while regulations that mandate severance payments to workers do not. Binding minimum 
wages also increase informality. 
 
 APPENDIX 
 
A.  Key Equations 
 
The key equations derived in the text are as follows under the assumption of uniform distribution for .   
 
The aggregate labor market condition, (22) is given by 
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while the formal sector output is 
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The aggregate net output can be written as  
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B. Planner's Problem 
 
The planner's objective function is as follows:  
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The first-order conditions are as follows:  
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Dividing (33) by (34) obtain 
 
 
 21 ( )
2
( )
( )c
c
c
z
z 
 
       
  (37) 
 
From the above note that ( )c   doesn't depend on .  Next, (35) can be rewritten as 
 
 
2
1 11( ) ( ) ( ) ( ( ) ( )) 0
2
c
i f c f f iB L A L zL F L L

                               
(38) 
 
C. Decentralized Solution in the Risk-Neutral Case 
 
The equations for the decentralized equilibrium in the risk-neutral case are easily obtained from the 
ones derived in the text by setting ( ) .U x x  We gather the key first-order conditions in the 
decentralized case below.  
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In addition, the no arbitrage condition for workers is  
 
 (1 )c f c iw z w      (42) 
  
Appendix   |   35 
 
 
Using (42) rewrite (40) as  
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The condition for   in the decentralized case is given by  
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Using (42) rewrite above as 
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A comparison of the conditions above with the planner's problem shows that they are identical 
if .iw    
 
Note that ( )fL   is the same function of , ,c z  and     in both cases. ( )iL   is same in both 
cases if .iw   Therefore, the two equations determining c  and   become identical in the two 
cases, and hence, they give the same solution which in turn implies  .iw    
 
Therefore, if the system of equations has a unique solution, then clearly the planner's problem 
corresponds to the decentralized equilibrium when workers are risk neutral. 
 
D.  Severance Payments by Firms (voluntary and mandatory) 
 
Below we show that voluntary severance payments allow production efficiency. Denoting severance 
payments by ,s  the firms do the following maximization exercise. 
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The first-order conditions are 
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  : 0c f cs L U s z         (48) 
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From (47) and (48) verify that ( ) ( ),fU w U s z    and hence, .fw s z   Therefore, (46) and 
(49) can be written as  
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Verify that the above are the same as (41) and (43) in the case of risk-neutral workers 
(because fw s z   implies )i fw w . Therefore, production efficiency is achieved if firms can offer 
severance payments voluntarily. 
 
The case of government mandated severance payments is similar to the one discussed above. 
In this case, firms in the formal sector take s  as given and choose , ,f fL w  and .c  If the government 
wants to attain production efficiency it can choose s  such that  ( )fw s s z   where ( )fw s  is the 
formal sector wage as a function of mandated severance payments s  chosen by the government. 
 
Note from (46) that the amount of labor employed by a formal sector firm is given by 
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The profit of a formal sector firm is given by  
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Therefore, the aggregate labor market condition in this case is given by  
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The indifference condition of entrepreneurs is given by  
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            
 (55) 
 
The informal sector output is same as in (29) above but the formal sector output is given by  
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                    (56) 
 
And the aggregate output is given by  
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Severance Payments with Leakage 
 
The first-order conditions for the case of voluntary severance payments with leakage are given by 
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(58) 
 
         : 1 1 0f c f c fw L U w           (59) 
 
  : 0c f cs L U s z         (60) 
 
 
    121 1: 2 cc c f f f fA L U w U s z wL L s
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     

          
  (61) 
 
(59) and (61) above imply that 
 
     f f f
L L
U s z U w
         (62) 
 
Therefore,  
 
 ( ) ( )fU s z U w     (63) 
 
Note from above that since 1,   ( ) ( )fU w U s z    or .fw s z   That is, firms do not 
provide full insurance in this case.  
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Therefore, (61) is given by  
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(64) 
 
And (58) is given by  
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              
(65) 
 
(64) and (65) do not correspond to (50) and (51). Therefore, production efficiency cannot be attained 
by voluntary severance payments or mandated severance payments corresponding to the level that 
firms would offer voluntarily if credibility was not an issue. 
 
If the government mandates severance payments or collects a layoff tax to provide 
unemployment insurance to workers (albeit with leakage), then firms take s  as given. In this case, 
equations (64) and (65) still hold, but (63) does not hold. 
 
The key equations for the numerical simulation are as follows. From (64) and (65) obtain 
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(66) 
 
The indifference condition for workers is given by  
 
 (1 ) ( ) ( ) ( )c f c iU w U s z U w          (67) 
 
The aggregate labor market condition, the indifference condition for entrepreneurs, and 
expression for output are same as in the case without leakage and are given by (54), (55), and (57), 
respectively. 
 
E. Administrative Burden of Firing 
 
If the government imposes a firing tax of ,b  the first-order conditions in the formal sector are given by  
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The first-order conditions are 
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(68) 
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Using (69), (70) can be written as  
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where   in this case is given by ( ) ( )( ) .f f
U w U z
U w

   
 
Next, (68) and (71) give us the key equation  
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Again, (72) and (1 ) ( ) ( ) ( )c f c iU w U z U w     determine fw  and c  independent of .   
 
It is clear from the discussion in the section on severance payments that to restore efficiency 
using b  we need the following two conditions to be satisfied.  
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It follows from (68) and (71) that we need (1 )f c c i cw b w z       and .fw b z    
Suppose the policy maker chooses b  such that .fw b z    This implies ( ) 0fb w z     . The 
last inequality follows from the concavity of the utility function. Therefore, a firing subsidy can be 
chosen to satisfy (74). At that level of b  we also need (1 ) .f c c i cw b w z       Verify that 
(1 )f c cw b    equals .f c cw z    Therefore, we need f cw   to equal .iw  Or, we need 
f i cw w   . But note that c  equals ( ) ( )( )f if
U w U w
U w

  which is strictly greater than f iw w  from the 
concavity of .U  Therefore, efficiency cannot be restored using a firing subsidy. 
 
For numerical simulation, the aggregate labor market condition, the indifference condition, and 
the expression for aggregate output are obtained simply by replacing s  by b  in equations (54), (55), 
and (57). 
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